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CHAPTER 17 
Public Utilities 
HERBERT BAER 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§17.1. Electric utilities: Service. Town of Sudbury v. Department 
of Public Utilities1 presented another stage in the litigation arising out 
of the attempt by the Boston Edison Company to erect a transmission 
line through the towns of Concord, Sudbury, and Wayland. In an 
earlier case of the same name2 the Supreme Judicial Court had affirmed 
the determination by the Department that the proposed line was 
"necessary for the purpose alleged, and will serve the public con-
venience and is consistent with the public interest." In the present 
case, the Court reviewed the decision of the Department3 authorizing 
Edison to take easements by eminent domain for the purpose of con-
structing the line.4 In many respects, the evidence and the contentions 
of the parties were a repetition of the prior case, as was predicted in 
the review of the earlier decision.5 One notable feature of the present 
decision is the approval which it gave to the Department's statement 
that the additional cost of underground, as opposed to overhead, con-
struction of the power lines had to be faced squarely; electric rates 
would have to be increased to carry the additional costs of under-
ground construction. This "cold hard fact of economics" had to be 
balanced against the "desire to preserve aesthetic values." The Court 
quoted the Department's opinion in some detail, approving its balance 
of the additional costs, as affecting the public generally, as against the 
aesthetic factor, as affecting only a relatively few persons.6 
§17.2. Transportation agencies: Transfer of certificates. The pro-
visions of General Laws, Chapter l59B, Section 11, which prohibit the 
transfer of an irregular route certificate of a common carrier "except 
in connection with a bona fide sale of the business of the transferor" 
have been the source of much difficulty in the administration of the 
statute by the Department. In A. B. & C. Motor Transportation Co. v. 
HERBERT BAER is Counsel of the Department of Public Utilities and a member of 
the firm of Maloney, Williams, Baer, and Doukas, Boston. 
§17.1. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1085, 218 N.E.2d 415. 
2 Town of Sudbury v. Department of Public Utilities, 343 Mass. 428, 179 N.E.2d 
263 (1962), discussed in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.2. 
3 Under G.L., c. 164, §72. 
4 D.P.U. 14023 (December, 1964). 
51962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.2. 
61966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1085, 1097-1099, 218 N.E.2d 415, 419-421. 
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Department of Public Utilities1 the Supreme Judicial Court had held 
that there was no bona fide sale of a business where a carrier had 
formerly conducted an extensive business under three separate certifi-
cates, including a general commodity certificate, but sold all its vehicles 
except one, after which it did only a fragmentary business. In Massa-
chusetts Furniture and Piano Movers Assn. v. Department of Public 
Utilities2 the Court, during the 1966 SURVEY year, again overruled an 
approval of a transfer. The business had become bankrupt and the 
trustee in bankruptcy had suspended business for approximately a 
year, after which he conducted a small quantity of business for two 
months preceding the transfer. The Department had approved the 
transfer on the ground that the interruption of service was a normal 
incident to the administration of a bankrupt's estate. The Supreme 
Judicial Court set aside the Department's order and found there was 
no business in existence of a type that could be an object of a bona fide 
sale. This holding makes it clear that the test of whether there is a 
bona fide sale of the business is the same for a trustee in bankruptcy 
as it is for any other transferor. 
It is significant that both the A. B. & C. and Massachusetts Furniture 
cases dealt with so-called "unlimited general commodity" certificates. 
These certificates authorize the hauling of any commodity anywhere 
in the Commonwealth. This type of certificate dates from the incep-
tion of regulation when all carriers in business were given rights (so-
called "grandfather rights") under Chapter 159B of the General Laws 
commensurate with those they possessed prior to regulation. (Such 
certificates have rarely, if ever, been granted by the Department except 
in connection with grandfather rights.) Almost none of the carriers 
exercise their rights under the certificates to the fullest extent. Al-
though they may not refuse any type of business, these carriers have 
specialized to a greater or lesser extent depending on the business of 
their regular customers and the type of equipment owned by them. 
Consequently, the value of the certificate is often out of proportion to 
the value of the business as it has been and is being conducted by the 
proposed transferor. Nevertheless, it has been the practice of the 
Department to approve transfers in cases in which a substantial busi-
ness has been conducted by the transferor, even though the commodi-
ties carried or the area covered may be much less than that authorized. 
Indeed, in some cases the transferee proposes to haul entirely different 
commodities. 
The A. B. & C. and the Massachusetts Furniture cases cast some 
doubt on the validity of the Department's view. The rationale that a 
small amount of business does not "support an approval of a transfer" 
of certificates for "extensive" routes suggests that the test may be 
whether the scope of the business conducted is coextensive with the 
rights sought to be transferred. It will not be surprising if this issue 
soon finds its way to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
§17.2. 1329 Mass. 719, llO N.E.2d 377 (1953). 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 603, 215 N.E.2d 769. 
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§17.3. Transportation agencies: Restricted license. Although the 
statutes explicitly empower the Department of Public Utilities to 
place limitations on the authority it grants to truckers 1 and regular 
route bus carriers,2 there is no comparable language in the statute deal-
ing with charter bus carriers.s Nevertheless, the Department has con-
sistently granted charter licenses for limited geographical areas on the 
rationale that public convenience and necessity for an additional 
carrier can call for such a license in some areas and not in others. 
Goodwin v. Department of Public Utilities! was the first challenge to 
this practice. The Court upheld the Department's practice, on the 
general principle that the power to deny or revoke a license altogether 
impliedly confers the lesser power to grant one in part only. 
§17.4. Transportation agencies: Rates. In Superline Co. v. My 
Bread Baking CO.1 a certificated common carrier, which had serviced 
a shipper for several months pursuant to a rate agreement which was 
less than its rate on file with the Department, was not permitted to 
recover the undercharge. The holding turned on the distinction, de-
veloped in prior decisions,2 between a carrier "acting as a contract 
carrier" and one acting as a common carrier. In Superline the carrier, 
because it acted pursuant to an executory contract, was acting as a 
contract carrier, although it had no authority to do so. The unspoken 
premise of cases such as Superline may be that it would be unjust to 
impose on the shipper the obligation to inform itself of the rates on 
file since the carrier impliedly represents, when it quotes a rate, that 
it may lawfully charge it. Thus the shipper prevailed, even though it 
was presumably on notice from the language on the bill of lading that 
the carrier had tariffs on file at the Department. 
As an alternative to sanctions against the carrier, the Department 
has felt that pressure on a carrier to bring suit to recover for such 
undercharges would be an appropriate method of regulation, when the 
shipper is larger than, and has greater bargaining power than, the 
carrier. It has been thought that civil suits would tend to discourage 
the exertion of pressure by shippers on carriers by making it difficult 
to retain the benefit from price concessions. On the other hand, a 
shipper who knowingly induces a carrier to accept less than the filed 
rate is itself subject to criminal sanctions. The effect of the present 
decision is to protect the shipper when its conduct lacks this element 
of knowledge. 
§17.3. 1 C.L., c. 159B, §3. 
2 Id., c. 159A, §7. 
SId. §IlA. 
41966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 871, 217 N.E.2d 782. 
§17.4. 1350 Mass. 364, 214 N.E.2d 885 (1966). 
2 Mount Tom Motor Line, Inc. v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 325 Mass. 45, 89 
N.E.2d 3 (1949); Rugg v. Doves, 320 Mass. 388, 69 N.E.2d 579 (1946); First National 
Stores, Inc. v. H. P. Welch Co., 316 Mass. 147, 55 N.E.2d 200 (1944). 
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B. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
§17.5. Electric and gas companies: Securities. In In re Buzzards 
Bay Gas CO.l the Department of Public Utilities noted that the com-
pany had capitalized expenditures for equipment installed on custom-
ers' premises, such as air conditioning and heating equipment. The 
Department made no findings based on these expenditures, but served 
notice that it would conduct a separate investigation to determine 
whether this type of expenditure is more properly accounted for as a 
promotional expense, and, if so, whether some guide lines should be 
promulgated for the control of promotional expenses. 
§17.6. Gas and electric companies: Service. General Laws, Chap-
ter 164, Section 30, provides that the Department may authorize a gas 
or electric company to extend its service to a city or town not named 
in its charter. When one company is involved, the issue is the relatively 
simple one of whether enough customers will be served by the exten-
sion to make it economically feasible without creating a burden on 
the existing customers of the company. When two companies file con-
current petitions to serve the same municipality, the conflict is often 
extremely difficult to resolve. Since both companies are able to produce 
proof of economic feasibility and since both are usually able to handle 
the new investments easily, there are very few objective factors distin-
guishing the two applicants. Difference in rates is not a reliable basis 
because rates are subject to change. Typically, the companies try to 
outdo each other in projecting the amount of mains each will install 
and the number of customers each will serve. It is usually the case that 
the last company to produce its evidence merely tops the estimates of 
the other. Moreover, it is to be expected that either company would 
extend its mains if the revenues warranted doing so. Such projections, 
therefore, are not reliable bases for choice between the two companies. 
A substantial difference in the proximity of the companies to the 
new territory may be the controlling factor in the choice, since the 
nearer company can provide service most economically.l If this factor 
is not present, the Department, being forced to make a decision in a 
case in which substantial objective differences simply do not exist, has 
referred to a variety of factors such as the community of interest be-
tween a company and a given municipality, as, for example, when one 
company is already serving the municipality with electricity and now 
seeks to serve it with gas.2 It is fair to say, however, that the decisions 
are difficult to rationalize and furnish little guidance in the way of a 
precedent for future cases. 
§17.5. 1 D.P.U. 15205 Guly, 1966). 
§17.6. lIn re Lowell Gas Co., D.P.U. 14847 (December, 1965). See also its 
companion case, In re Mystic Valley Gas Co., D.P.U. 14863 (December, 1965). 
2 In re Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Co., D.P.U. 14889 (May, 1966); see also 
its companion case, In re Lowell Gas Co., D.P.U. 14737 (May, 1966). 
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§17.7. Transportation agencies: Charter buses. Peter Pan Bus 
Lines, Inc. 1 is noteworthy because the decision discusses in some detail 
the effect of a recent statute2 which prohibits a charter carrier from 
changing the place where its buses are usually garaged from one city 
to another without approval of the Department. This statute, in com-
bination with the Department's minimum rate orders which requires 
that "deadhead" mileage must be charged at the minimum rate, has 
the effect of limiting the areas which each carrier can serve. It is also 
consistent with the legislative policy of limiting the number of car-
riers in any area to those justified by the public need. The petitioner 
garaged three buses in Amherst and used them for interstate charters. 
The Department refused permission to garage buses at Amherst for 
intrastate charter because it found that this additional charter compe-
tition would jeopardize the ability of another carrier operating locally 
to continue its regular route operations, which depend to a great extent 
upon the assistance derived from charter revenues. 
The decision also dispelled possible confusion among carriers as to 
the proper application of a minimum rate order. The Court stated a 
carrier cannot compute mileage from a specific garage, even if the 
garage predated the amendment to Section l1A,4 unless it is custom-
arily used for garaging buses used for charter. If the garage is used 
solely for the storage of buses operating on regular routes, the carrier 
may not compute mileage from that garage for charter trips. 
In another decision involving the principal place of garaging, a 
carrier who had acquired a license by transfer in 1961, representing 
that his place of business would be Concord, sought to transfer his 
license.5 The evidence demonstrated that the carrier never had a place 
of business in Concord but at all times maintained his only garage in 
Dracut. Since the charter business operating out of Dracut was not the 
same business he sought to transfer, namely, a business operating out 
of Concord, the Department held that the proposed transfer was not 
pursuant to a bona fide sale of the business within the meaning of 
Section 7A of General Laws, Chapter l59A. 
§17.8. Transportation agencies: Appeals. The Commercial Motor 
Vehicle Division of the Department has been delegated the authority 
to administer the provisions of Chapter 159B of the General Laws 
relating to the grant, amendment, and transfer of permits and certifi-
cates'! A person aggrieved by any decision of the Director of the Divi-
sion may appeal to the Commission. In Murphy & Driscoll, Inc. 2 the 
§17.7. 1 D.P.U. 14877 (December, 1965). 
2 Acts of 1961, c. 268, §2, noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.8. 
S D.P.U. 9545 (November, 1951); D.P.U. 6846 (December, 1942). 
4 G.L., c. 159A, §lIA, is the general statute that governs the issuance by the 
Department of charter bus licenses; it was amended in 1961 by Acts of 1961, c. 268, 
§2. 
5 In re Harold C. Peabody, D.P.U. 14924 (October, 1965). 
§17.8. 1 D.P.U. 7684 (February, 1947). 
2 D.P.U. 14967 (May, 1966). 
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Commission pointed out some deficiencies in the procedure followed 
by the Division in a revocation proceeding and set forth some guide-
lines for the conduct of hearings: notice of hearings in revocation 
matters should describe the conduct alleged to be the violation which 
prompted the hearing; the subpoena power should be used more gener-
ously; and the respondent should be informed as to what records 
should be produced. 
§17.9. Water companies: Rates. Nantasket Water Worksl is an-
other instance in which the Department has allowed new rates on a 
temporary basis, where a company has installed meters and has sub-
stituted a new set of metered rates for the old fixed rate.2 Projections 
as to the revenue effects of the new rates are unreliable, because con-
sumption typically decreases when meters are installed; it has been 
found that a trial period after the adoption of metered rates furnishes 
the only reliable basis for assessing the propriety of rates. 
C. LEGISLATION 
§17.10. Transportation agencies: Contract carrier license. Prior 
to the latest amendment, an ambiguity existed as to whether, under 
General Laws, Chapter 164, Section 4, a contract carrier holding a 
permit authorizing transportation of named commodities within stated 
geographical limits could add to its list of customers served without 
prior approval by the Department. The form of the license issued by 
the Department has always contained a list of the customers served. 
Whether under this form a carrier could add new customers or merely 
new contracts with existing customers has never been settled. Depart-
ment policy has not been consistent over the years as Commission per-
sonnel has varied, and the Supreme Judicial Court's only pronounce-
ment on the issue has been dictum.! 
Chapter 196 of the Acts of 1966 now makes it clear that the carrier 
must obtain approval before contracting with a new customer. The 
justification for the issuance of a contract carrier permit in the first 
instance is that the carrier proposes to render a specialized service not 
offered by a common carrier. Lack of control by the Department over 
the addition of new customers would tend to blur the distinction be-
tween common and contract carriers. Licenses originally issued on the 
basis of evidence of a need for special service by specific shippers could 
be converted virtually into a general authority by adding an unlimited 
amount of new customers without proof of public convenience and 
necessity or without establishing the need of a given shipper for spe-
cialized service. The amendment will enable the Department to pre-
vent unfair competition of contract carriers with common carriers. 
§17.9. 1 D.P.U. 14918 (December, 1965). 
2 See Wannacomet Water Co., D.P.U. 13525 Gune, 1961). 
§17.10. 1 Retail Stores Delivery, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities, 339 
Mass. 441, 159 N.E.2d 646 (1959). 
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§17.11. Transportation agencies: Service. Chapter 372 of the Acts 
of 1966 provides that no public hearing may be held by the Depart-
ment of Public Utilities in connection with a discontinuance of service 
by bus companies except after 30 days' notice to the public. Prior to 
the statute, the only notice requirement was a rule of the Department 
requiring a company to give the Department notice and to post notice 
of a planned discontinuance in its terminals and public waiting 
rooms.1 The Department could hold a speedy hearing prior to the 
discontinuance. 
The new statute, in its extension of the notice period, has apparently 
inadvertently aggravated the condition it sought to eliminate. There 
is no provision precluding a bus company from discontinuing service 
without a hearing. Under current Department rules, a bus company 
may discontinue service upon seven days' notice. Since the Department 
cannot order continuance of service without a hearing, and cannot 
under the new statute hold a hearing for 30 days, the bus service may 
be discontinued for 23 days before the Department can even commence 
its investigation. A solution to this dilemma may be the amendment of 
Department rules to require a carrier to give at least 30 days' notice 
prior to any discontinuance of service. The difficulty is that such a 
change in the present rule would place an undue burden on carriers 
in the frequent instances in which only minor adjustments are con-
templated and hence a hearing may not be warranted. If the Depart-
ment's seven-day notice period is inadequate in a number of cases, a 
more satisfactory statutory provision would be to give the Department 
the discretion, comparable to that given in rate matters, to postpone 
the discontinuance for a limited period pending investigation. 
§17.11. 1 D.P.U. 4350 (March, 1932; March, 1944). 
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